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 Works Councils and Separations:
Voice, Monopoly, and Insurance E®ects¤
Boris Hirsch, Thorsten Schank, Claus Schnabela
Abstract: Using a large linked employer{employee data set for Germany, we ¯nd
that the existence of a works council is associated with a lower separation rate to
employment, in particular for men and workers with low tenure. While works council
monopoly e®ects show up in all speci¯cations, clear voice e®ects are only visible for
low tenured workers. Works councils also reduce separations to non-employment,
and this impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance e®ects only show up for
workers with tenure of more than one year. Our results indicate that works councils
primarily represent the interests of a speci¯c clientele.
Zusammenfassung: Unter Verwendung eines gro¼en kombinierten Firmen{
BeschÄ aftigten-Datensatzes fÄ ur Deutschland ¯nden wir, dass die Existenz eines
Betriebsrates mit einer geringeren Abgangsrate in (anderweitige) BeschÄ aftigung
einhergeht, dies insbesondere bei mÄ annlichen Arbeitnehmern und solchen mit
geringen BetriebszugehÄ origkeitsdauern. WÄ ahrend es Anzeichen fÄ ur Monopole®ekte
eines Betriebsrates in allen empirischen Spezi¯kationen gibt, sind eindeutige
Voicee®ekte lediglich fÄ ur BeschÄ aftige mit geringen BetriebszugehÄ origkeitsdauern
erkennbar. Ein weiteres Ergebnis ist, dass bei Vorhandensein eines Betriebsrates
auch die Abgangsrate in NichtbeschÄ aftigung abnimmt, wobei dieser E®ekt abermals
bei mÄ annlichen BeschÄ aftigten ausgeprÄ agter ist. Diese Versicherungse®ekte eines
Betriebsrates treten jedoch nur fÄ ur Arbeitnehmer mit BetriebszugehÄ origkeitsdauern
von Ä uber einem Jahr auf. Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass BetriebsrÄ ate in
erster Linie die Interessen einer spezi¯schen Klientel vertreten.
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1 Introduction
Labor interest representation at the plant level has been found to a®ect quits and
labor turnover in a number of studies for di®erent countries. In an early test of the
exit-voice hypothesis, Freeman (1980) obtains empirical evidence for the U.S. that
union workers experience lower quit and separation rates (and more tenure) than
non-union workers (see also Freeman and Medo®, 1984; Delery et al., 2000). For
the U.K., Addison and Bel¯eld (2004) report that ¯rms with unions have lower quit
rates. For Germany, where plant-based works councils rather than industry-level
unions act as employees' collective voice at the workplace, most empirical studies
¯nd that the presence of a works council reduces separations and labor turnover (see,
e.g., Frick and Sadowski, 1995; Frick, 1996; Addison et al., 2001; Dilger, 2002; Frick
and MÄ oller, 2003).1
Less clear, however, is which kind of separations are reduced by works councils.
On the one hand, the presence of a works council can be expected to reduce
(voluntary) quits due to collective-voice e®ects or due to the higher wages paid
in ¯rms with works councils. On the other hand, works councils may use their
massive consultation and codetermination rights to prevent dismissals and shield
employees from unemployment. Such negative e®ects of works councils on quits and
dismissals are found by Frick and Sadowski (1995) and Frick (1996), but a replication
study by Kraft (2006) based on the same data set reaches di®erent conclusions. A
reduction in voluntary quits is also found by Pfeifer (2007), and Ellguth (2006)
obtains some evidence for lower separation rates in establishments with a works
council (although dismissals are not reduced in establishments that shed labor). The
bulk of other studies usually have not been able to distinguish between voluntary
quits by employees and dismissals by employers due to a lack of precise information
in the data. What is more, extant studies have not been able to take into account
where employees end up after the separation, i.e. whether they move to another
¯rm or become unemployed. We therefore do not know whether works councils just
reduce separations or also protect employees from becoming unemployed.
In this study, we use a large-scale linked employer{employee data set for Germany
to investigate the e®ect of works councils on separations. In contrast to previous
studies, which have only used establishment data, we are able to take the perspective
of employees and pay special attention to the outcome of separations, i.e. whether
they result in employment in other ¯rms or in non-employment. We also investigate
1 Notable exceptions are the (small-sample) studies by Kraft (1986), who ¯nds that individual
voice but not collective voice via works councils serves to reduce high quit rates, and by
Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner (2004), who show that the introduction of a works
council does not reduce quit rates (compared to matched pairs of similar ¯rms not introducing
a works council). For surveys of the empirical evidence on the economic consequences of works
councils, see Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner (2004) or Jirjahn (2006).4
which type of workers bene¯ts most from the presence of a works council, and
we improve on previous studies by explicitly taking into account unobserved plant
heterogeneity.2
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 brie°y sketches the role and the powers
of works councils in Germany and provides some theoretical considerations that are
used to derive testable hypotheses on the e®ects of works councils on separations.
Our empirical speci¯cation is set up in section 3, while section 4 describes our linked
employer-employee data. The results of our empirical investigation are presented
and discussed in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Theoretical
Considerations
The German works council is the counterpart of the workplace union in other
countries. According to the German Works Constitution Act, works councils are
mandatory but not automatic in all establishments exceeding a size threshold of ¯ve
permanent employees. They are not automatic in that they must be elected (by the
entire workforce in the establishment), although just three employees who are at
least 18 years old or a trade union represented in the establishment are necessary
to start the election procedure.3 While works councils are formally independent of
unions, in practice the majority of works councilors are union members. The size of
the works council is ¯xed by law and is a function of the establishment's employment
level. Works councilors may be full time once certain threshold sizes of employment
are reached, and the employer bears the entire cost of the works council apparatus
(for more institutional details, see Addison et al., 2001 and Addison, Bellmann,
Schnabel, and Wagner, 2004).
Works councils have fairly extensive information, consultation, and codetermi-
nation rights prescribed by law. The employer has to provide the works council with
both timely and comprehensive information on all matters related to the discharge of
its statutory functions. Consultation rights cover such matters as planned structural
alterations to the plant, all decisions relating to manpower planning, and individual
dismissals. If the employer fails to consult the works council, a dismissal is rendered
2 In a recent analysis of job duration in Germany, Boockmann and Ste®es (2008) also include a
works council dummy which is found to reduce separations to employment and unemployment.
However, they do not speci¯cally address and disentangle works councils' voice, monopoly, and
insurance e®ects, and they only focus on male employees.
3 Note that in the year 2000, which is at the beginning of our observation period, only about
16 percent of establishments with ¯ve employees or more did have a works council, while 53
percent of employees worked in an establishment with a works council (see Addison, Bellmann,
Schnabel, and Wagner, 2004).5
null and void. If the employer cannot reach consent with the works council concerning
a dismissal, the case usually ends up in labor court. In addition, and in contrast
to continental European counterparts of workplace representation, German works
councils have codetermination rights on what are termed `social matters'. These
include remuneration arrangements, the commencement and termination of working
hours, the regulation of overtime and reduced working hours, and health and safety
measures. In all such areas, failure to reach agreement leads to their adjudication
through a conciliation board. Works councils can also negotiate social plans, which
establish compensation for the dislocation caused by plant closings or partial closings
and by major changes in organization.
In contrast to unions, works councils may not call a strike, and they are excluded
from reaching agreement with the employer on wages and working conditions that
are settled or normally settled by collective agreements between unions and employer
associations at industry level (unless the latter explicitly authorize works agreements
of this sort). However, their extensive rights of information, consultation, and
codetermination on many other issues mean that works councils have a strong
in°uence which can be used for rent-seeking, and unsurprisingly e®ective wages
have been shown to be higher in establishments with works councils (e.g., Addison
et al., 2001; HÄ ubler and Jirjahn, 2003).
This brief description of the institutional background makes clear that the
German works council is not only a classic vehicle for the expression of collective
voice but also has considerable bargaining power which in practice can be applied to
all sorts of questions, including wages and dismissals. Against this backdrop, we are
now able to analyze the direct and indirect e®ects of works councils on separations.
According to the exit-voice model of unionism developed by Freeman and Medo®
(1984), plant-level unions (and works councils) have two faces or roles.4 On the one
hand, they represent the preferences of the employees and act as a collective-voice
institution that enables employees to safely express their dissatisfaction with certain
working conditions instead of quitting the job (or being laid o®). If management
listens to employees' voice and improves working conditions accordingly, costly quits
will be avoided, employee morale will be higher, and labor productivity may rise.
On the other hand, unions play a monopoly role: Employees' increased bargaining
power is used to push through higher wages, increased employment security, and
various other bene¯ts.
Applying this model to the German works council enables us to derive testable
hypotheses on the direct and indirect e®ects of works councils on separations. When
formulating these hypotheses we must take into account that our data set (described
4 For extensive (and critical) discussions of this model, see Addison and Bel¯eld (2004) and
Dilger (2002).6
in section 4) does not allow us to distinguish between voluntary quits and involuntary
dismissals. Instead we are able to distinguish between separations that result in
employment in another ¯rm (which may predominantly be voluntary quits) and
separations leading to non-employment (most of which may be involuntary).
Starting with separations to employment in other ¯rms, works councils can be
expected to reduce this sort of separations through voice and monopoly routes of
impact. The collective-voice route is that works councils o®er dissatis¯ed employees
who are considering quitting an alternative means of expressing discontent and
possibly changing working conditions. In Germany, employees who feel themselves
unfairly treated by their supervisors usually contact their works council which
will try to solve the problem in discussions or negotiations with management.
Moreover, the presence of a works council with extensive legal rights and continuous
contact with management can be expected to result in improved labor relations in
the establishment, resulting in lower rates of quits and dismissals. The monopoly
route of works councils' impact is that quits are likely to be lowered by the
improvement in wages and working conditions induced by works councils (and found
in almost all empirical studies, see the surveys by Frick and MÄ oller, 2003, and
by Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2004). These monopoly e®ects on wages and
working conditions, which are also re°ected in lower pro¯ts due to works council
rent-seeking, must be taken into account in the empirical analysis in order to isolate
the collective-voice e®ect of works councils.
Concerning separations to non-employment, a negative impact might result from
the insurance function that works councils have, in particular for those workers who
will not easily ¯nd a job again. In this perspective, works councils { like other labor
market institutions { `serve an important function of social insurance' (Agell, 2002,
p. 108) against labor market risks. In order to prevent (or at least delay) dismissals,
they can make use of their speci¯c consultation and consent rights concerning
individual dismissals and their codetermination rights concerning mass layo®s and
social compensation plans.5 They also could transfer their massive bargaining power
from other ¯elds in order to convince employers not to lay o® employees.6 As a result,
5 The Works Constitution Act (xx102{103) stipulates that prior consultation with the works
council is a prerequisite for the validity of any dismissal. The works council has one week in
which to respond to an ordinary dismissal and three days in case of an extraordinary dismissal.
If the works council objects to the dismissal, the employee has a claim to continued employment
pending a judicial decision or until a (usually costly) settlement has been reached. For collective
dismissals special procedures apply, depending on the size of the establishment and the number
of employees a®ected (see xx111{113). For instance, the works council may contest mass layo®s
on the ground that improper criteria were used for the selection of employees to be laid o®.
For more details on dismissal regulation and the role of works councils, see Frick and Sadowski
(1995).
6 However, when analyzing works councils' e®ects on employment change, Addison and Teixeira
(2006) report that works councils do not slow the pace of employment adjustment in Germany.7
the separation rate to non-employment can be expected to be lower in establishments
with works councils.7
Taken together, these arguments imply two hypotheses on the e®ects of works
councils on separations. First, the existence of a works council can be expected to
reduce the separation rate to employment in other ¯rms due to voice and monopoly
e®ects that lower employees' incentives to quit. Second, the separation rate to non-
employment should be lower in plants with works councils due to the insurance
function and the legal powers of the works council.
3 Empirical Speci¯cation
To test the hypotheses laid out in section 2, we will employ methods of competing
risks survival analysis, i.e. we will ¯t competing risks models.8 Standard univariate
survival analysis models the time spent in a given state before transition to another
state. This gives rise to a single hazard rate function, which is the instantaneous
probability of leaving the state at some time t conditional on survival up to t. Other
than univariate survival analysis, competing risks survival analysis allows for the
possibility that subjects may exit into more than just one destination state. The term
`competing risks' is used because the subject is confronted with exit probabilities
into di®erent, mutually exclusive destination states. By modelling these di®erent
destination-speci¯c hazard functions, competing risks models serve as models of
multivariate survival analysis.
More concretely, suppose there are M workers (indexed m = 1;:::;M) with
N employment spells (indexed i = 1;:::;N) who work for J ¯rms (indexed
j = 1;:::;J). An employment spell is the period from the beginning until the
end of a worker's employment relationship within a particular ¯rm. A worker can
exit employment via two possible routes: The worker can either change his or her
employer, i.e. he or she separates to employment, (route e) or can change to non-
employment (route n). Let T r denote the latent spell duration for exit via route r
with r = e;n. T r thus gives the spell duration if there were no other routes than r,
which may cause the employment spell to end. T r is latent because the duration of
7 It could be argued that two other impacts of works council presence on economic performance
found in most empirical studies (see the survey by Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2004)
may play an indirect role for separations. First, works council rent-seeking usually results in
higher labor cost and lower company pro¯ts, which in turn may lead to higher layo® rates.
Second, the presence of a works council is often associated with higher productivity in the
establishment, which in turn could either reduce the need to lay o® the more costly workers or
could increase the number of layo®s if productivity increases are labor-saving. However, these
level-e®ects should only show up after the introduction of a works council (which we are not
able to investigate).
8 For details about competing risks models we refer to Cameron and Trivedi (2005, ch. 19) and
Jenkins (2005, ch. 9).8
an employment spell is either censored, i.e. no exit takes place during observation,
or ends with a separation to employment or non-employment. Hence, the observed









i refers to the duration of a censored employment spell without any exit
during the period of observation.
Let se
i(t) denote the latent instantaneous separation rate to employment at time
t and sn
i (t) the latent instantaneous separation rate to non-employment at time t,
where t corresponds to the time elapsed since the beginning of the spell (that is the
worker's tenure). Let further si(t) denote the overall instantaneous separation rate
at time t. Assuming (conditional) independence in competing risks, i.e. latent failure






The overall separation rate is then the sum of the two route-speci¯c separation
rates. Under the independence in competing risks assumption, the estimation of
the competing risks model becomes straightforward: We just have to estimate two
separate hazard rate models for the instantaneous separation rates to employment
and non-employment, where exits via the other route are considered as censored
spells.






ik(t)) denote a vector of k time-varying covariates observed
for employment spell i at time t with r = e;n. Next, let ¯r = (¯r
1;:::;¯r
k)0 denote




j(i)l(t)) is a vector of l time-varying covariates
observed for ¯rm j(i) at time t, for which the worker with spell i is working, while
°r = (°r
1;:::;°r
l )0 denotes the corresponding vector of l coe±cients. Finally, let
Àr
j(i) denote a ¯rm-speci¯c time-invariant constant. We model the instantaneous
























Equation (3) therefore de¯nes conditional proportional hazard functions with
baseline hazard sr
0(t) and unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the ¯rm Àr
j(i),
i.e. two mixed proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates.9
9 By analogy, unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the worker could be taken into account9
Specifying sr
0(t) as a step function in the worker's tenure, we arrive at a piecewise-
constant exponential model. Moreover, we assume that Àr
j(i) follows a Gamma
distribution with mean one and ¯nite variance, i.e. E[Àr
j(i)] = 1 and Var[Àr
j(i)] < 1, as
put forward by Abbring and van den Berg (2007). Therefore, we get two piecewise-
constant exponential models with shared gamma frailties, which can be thought of as
gamma-distributed random e®ects re°ecting unobserved heterogeneity at the level
of the ¯rm. As stated above, the estimation of the competing risks model is then
achieved by separate estimation of these two models.
If zr
j(i)(t) includes a works council dummy WCj(i)(t), which is one if spell i is an











WC denotes the route-speci¯c coe±cient of the works council dummy.10
Hence, exp¯r
WC ¡1 gives the ceteris paribus percentage change in the instantaneous
route-speci¯c separation rate through a works council.
4 Data
The data set used in subsequent empirical analyses is the German LIAB, i.e. the
Linked Employer{Employee Data Set of the Institute for Employment Research
(Institut fÄ ur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB) of the German Federal
Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fÄ ur Arbeit). The LIAB is created by linking
the process-produced person-speci¯c data of the IAB with the IAB Establishment
Panel (cf. Alda et al., 2005). Using the LIAB we are therefore able to control both
for personal and establishment characteristics.
The employee history used for constructing the LIAB is based on the integrated
noti¯cation procedure for the health, pension, and unemployment insurances.11 This
procedure requires all employers to report all information of their employees if
covered by the social security system, where misreporting is legally sanctioned.
Noti¯cations are compulsory both at the beginning and the end of employment.
Additionally, an annual report must be made for each employee employed on the 31st
by including a term Àr
m(i) multiplicatively. However, in our empirical analysis we only have one
spell per worker (see footnote 14). Hence, including gamma frailties to allow for unobserved
worker heterogeneity proved to be insigni¯cant and its inclusion did not change the parameter
estimates of the other variables, so that we neglect the respective mixed proportional hazards
in our further analysis. For details about mixed proportional hazard models, see Cameron and
Trivedi (2005, chs. 17/18), Jenkins (2005), and van den Berg (2001).
10 Note that unlike the general expression in equation (4), in our empirical analysis the works
council dummy is a non-time-varying variable due to the construction of the data set.
11 Details are given by Alda et al. (2005) and Bender et al. (2000).10
of December of the year. As a consequence, only those workers, salaried employees,
and trainees who are covered by social security are included. Thus, among others,
civil servants, self-employed, those in marginal employment, students enrolled in
higher education, and family workers are not included. All in all, approximately 80
percent of all people employed in western Germany are part of the employee history.
The data include, among others things, information for every employee on daily
gross wage, censored at the social security contribution ceiling, on the employee's
occupation and occupational status, on industry, and on the start and end of
each employee noti¯cation. Furthermore, individual characteristics, such as age,
schooling, and nationality are contained. Finally, an establishment number is
included which is used to link the employee history and the IAB Establishment
Panel.
The employer side of our data set is given by the IAB Establishment Panel, a
random sample of establishments (not ¯rms) from the comprehensive Employment
Statistics drawn according to the principle of optimal strati¯cation.12 Strata are
de¯ned over plant sizes and industries, where all in all ten plant sizes and 16
industries are considered. Since the survey is based on the Employment Statistics
aggregated via the establishment number as of the 30th of June of a year, it
only includes establishments which employ at least one employee covered by social
security. Every year since 1993 (1996) the IAB Establishment Panel has surveyed
the same establishments from all industries in western (eastern) Germany. Response
rates of units which have been interviewed repeatedly exceed 80 percent. The IAB
Establishment Panel is created to serve the needs of the Federal Employment Agency,
so that the focus on employment-related topics is predominant. Questions deal,
among other things, with the number of employees, the working week for full-time
workers, coverage by collective agreements, the existence of a works council, the
establishment's performance and export share, and the technological status of the
plant.
Linking both the IAB Establishment Panel and the employee history through
the establishment number gives the LIAB.13 We will use version 2 of the
LIAB longitudinal model, which is based on a balanced panel of establishments
participating in the IAB Establishment Panel in each year between 2000 and 2002
and provides information on all workers which have been employed by any of these
establishments for at least one day. The information of whether or not a plant has
a works council (which is our main variable of interest in explaining the separation
probabilities) refers to the 30th of June of the respective years (2000, 2001, and 2002).
We select those workers who are employed by any of the establishments at the 30th
12 Details about the IAB Establishment Panel are given by KÄ olling (2000).
13 Details about the di®erent LIAB models and their versions are given by Alda (2005).11
of June 2000 and follow them until the 30th of June 2002.14 We do not investigate
the time periods before and afterwards to ensure that we have complete information
on the works council regime.15 We have argued above that a works council may
reduce dismissals to non-employment due to its legal powers. However, Addison,
Bellmann, and KÄ olling (2004) and Andrews et al. (2007) ¯nd a positive association
between works council presence and plant closings. To rule out this second e®ect
we have excluded those plants with considerable downsizing and closings since the
determinants of separation in those plants are quite distinct (so that one should not
pool all observations into one regression). More precisely, we excluded plants with
a workforce of at least ten employees that experienced an employment reduction by
at least 25 percent between 2000 and 2002.
For all workers we have accurate information on their employment spells. Workers
who are still employed by the same establishment at the 30th of June 2002 are treated
as censored. For those who leave their establishments between 30th of June 2000 and
30th of June 2002, we know whether they move to another plant or whether they
move to non-employment. Therefore, we are able to construct the separation rates
discussed in section 3, viz. the separation rate to employment and the separation
rate to non-employment, where employment refers to employment at another
establishment.16 Separations into non-employment end either in unemployment or
are not recorded in the data any more (`unknown'). The latter either implies that
the person has changed to non-employment without receiving bene¯ts from the
unemployment o±ce or that the person has become, for instance, a self-employed
not included in the employee history. While our data set does not enable us to
disaggregate this category of unknown destination, information from other data
sets suggests that the majority of employees in this category have moved to
non-employment.17 Therefore, we have pooled the separations into unemployment
and the separations into `unknown' to separations into non-employment. We have
not modelled them separately because the assumption of independent hazards of
separating into unemployment and of separating into the `unknown' group would
clearly be erroneous.
14 If a worker moves to another establishment, then the duration of his new employment
relationship is not considered. Hence, our data set consists of one spell per worker.
15 By a similar argument, we have dropped those establishments which have changed their works
council regime between 2000 and 2002, since we do not know when the change actually takes
place. This reduced our regression sample from 2,667 to 2,493 plants.
16 As mentioned above, we do not observe whether a separation is initiated by the employer
(a dismissal) or the employee (a quit). However, we expect that quits are more likely if the
worker separates to employment, while the probability of a dismissal is higher if a separation
to non-employment occurs.
17 See, for example, Bartelheimer and Wieck (2005) for a transition matrix between employment
and non-employment, based on the German Socio-Economic Panel, which allows strati¯cation
of the `unknown' into detailed categories.12
We restrict our analysis to western Germany (since the eastern Germany labor
market is still in a special transformation process) and to full-time employees18.
This leaves us { after dropping establishments (and their employees) with missing
values of the covariates in any of the years { with information on a stock of
101,759 employees working for 2,493 establishments at the 30th of June 2000,
1,193 of which have a works council. Table 1 reports that 9,147 employees leave
their establishments to join another company, while 5,714 workers exit to non-
employment. The remaining 86,898 workers are employed by the same establishment
until the 30th of June 2002. It turns out that both separation rates are lower if a
works council exists. Therefore, the descriptive statistics con¯rm the theoretical
expectations from section 2. The existence of a works council reduces the separation
rate for all reported subgroups (male vs. female, workers with tenure of no more
than one year vs. workers with more tenure). Furthermore, it can be seen that the
reduction in the exit probabilities associated with the existence of a works council is
larger for men than for women. Finally, works councils have a greater impact on the
raw hazards for separations to non-employment than for separations to employment.
Of course, these relationships may change once we take other covariates into
account. For example, the reduction in separation rates associated with the existence
of a works council may simply re°ect the fact that works councils are more often
found in large establishments which have lower separation rates. Due to the inclusion
of establishment data, we are able to control as well for person-speci¯c characteristics
as for characteristics of the establishment the employee is working for. Therefore, the
labor market's demand and supply sides can be taken into consideration. The sample
means of the works council dummy and other explanatory variables are displayed in
the appendix table.
A shortcoming of the LIAB is that daily gross wages, which are one of our control
variables, are censored at the social security contribution ceiling, viz. e143.95 in
2000, e146.02 in 2001, and e147.95 in 2002. This a®ects about 10 percent of the
observations in our sample. Obviously, using wage data without any correction would
give biased estimates. We deal with this problem by applying single imputation,
i.e. imputing all censored wages with estimated wages. Assuming that daily gross
wages have a log-normal distribution, which seems to be a plausible approximation,
¯rst a Tobit model is estimated, where the dependent variable is log daily gross
wage and the independent variables are those included in further analyses. Then
18 Since there is no detailed information on the number of hours worked, we exclude employees
working part-time (at any time in the observation period). Moreover, apprentices and a small
number of employees experiencing recalls are excluded. In addition, we keep only individuals
which were on the 1st of January 2000 between 16 and 55 years old, where the upper bound
should ensure that the transitions into non-employment are not due to (early) retirement.
Finally, noti¯cations which start and end at the same day and bene¯t noti¯cations which
correspond to employment noti¯cations at the same time are deleted.13














All all 101,759 (100) 9,147 (9.0) 5,714 (5.6)
with works council 85,569 (100) 7,164 (8.4) 4,067 (4.8)
without works council 16,190 (100) 1,983 (12.2) 1,647 (10.2)
Male all 74,232 (100) 6,551 (8.8) 3,908 (5.3)
with works council 62,574 (100) 5,092 (8.1) 2,696 (4.3)
without works council 11,685 (100) 1,459 (12.5) 1,212 (10.4)
Female all 27,527 (100) 2,596 (9.4) 1,806 (6.6)
with works council 23,022 (100) 2,072 (9.0) 1,371 (6.0)
without works council 4,505 (100) 524 (11.6) 435 (9.7)
Tenure · 1 year all 10,653 (100) 621 (5.8) 775 (7.3)
with works council 8,077 (100) 393 (4.9) 507 (6.3)
without works council 2,576 (100) 228 (8.9) 268 (10.4)
Tenure > 1 year all 100,363 (100) 8,526 (8.5) 4,939 (4.9)
with works council 84,669 (100) 6,771 (8.0) 3,560 (4.2)
without works council 15,694 (100) 1,755 (11.2) 1,379 (8.8)
Notes:
The sum of workers with not more than one year of tenure and of workers with more than
one year of tenure (111,016) is larger than the total number of workers (101,759) since 9,257
workers switch between both categories during the observation period.
for every censored observation a random value is drawn from a normal distribution
left-truncated at the social security contribution ceiling (with predicted log wage as
mean, and standard deviation as estimated from the Tobit model).19
5 Econometric Analysis
In this section, we turn to our multivariate analyses. We ¯t independent competing
risk models, where the instantaneous separation rates to employment and non-
employment are modelled as piecewise-constant exponential models both with and
without shared gamma frailties at the level of the establishment. The baseline
hazard is modelled as a step function in the worker's tenure.20 Our main focus
19 For details on single imputation in the case of censored wages see Gartner (2005).
20 Tenure categories are 0{30, 31{60, 61{90, 91{120, 121{150, 151{180, 181{210, 211{240, 241{
270, 271{300, 301{330, 331{360, 361{720, 721{1080, 1081{1440, 1441{1800, 1801{2160, 2161{
2520, 2521{2800, 2881{3240, 3241{3600, 3601{5400, 5401{7200, and more than 7200 days of
employment, respectively.14
is on the e®ect of the works council dummy on separations. All regressions also
include a number of personal and establishment characteristics as control variables.
Personal characteristics are represented by a male and a non-German dummy, nine
age dummies, six education dummies, and ten occupation dummies. Establishment
characteristics include ¯ve establishment size dummies, two dummies indicating
whether the establishment is covered by collective agreements, a dummy indicating
good technological status, the proportions of female as well as quali¯ed workers, and
ten sectoral dummies. Finally, we add three year dummies. For a discussion of the
expected impact of these control variables on the respective separation rates we refer
to Hirsch et al. (2008).
As argued above and con¯rmed descriptively, the existence of a works council is
likely to reduce the separation rate to employment due to voice and monopoly e®ects.
In the ¯rst and the third column of table 2 this is indeed found. The coe±cient of
the works council dummy is negative and statistically signi¯cant at the 5 percent
level. The e®ect is also signi¯cant from an economic point of view because estimated
coe±cients of ¡0:136 without and ¡0:139 with establishment frailties indicate that
the existence of a works council is associated with a ceteris paribus decline in the
separation rate to employment by 12.7 and 13.0 percent, respectively. Put di®erently,
the separation rate to employment in plants without a works council, which is 12.2
percent in table 1, would be (evaluated at the sample average) about 1.5 percentage
points lower if a works council existed.
However, these estimates (which are consistent with Boockmann and Ste®es,
2008), mix the monopoly and the voice e®ect. To disentangle these two e®ects, we
include in a next step the worker's log daily gross wage (similar to Freeman, 1980)
and a dummy indicating whether the responding manager rated the establishment's
pro¯t situation as bad (i.e. 4 or 5 on a descending ¯ve-point index). These control
variables should capture the indirect impact of a works council on workers' separation
rate via its impact on workers' wages and establishments' pro¯tability due to the
monopoly e®ect. Consequently, the estimated coe±cient of the works council dummy
should now be lower. This is clearly con¯rmed by the estimates presented in columns
two and four. The two additional control variables have the expected e®ects: The
probability of separation to employment correlates negatively with the level of wages
and is substantially higher in plants with bad pro¯tability. Correspondingly, the size
of the estimated coe±cient of the works council dummy is reduced markedly, which
re°ects the works council's monopoly e®ect.21 While still negative, the coe±cient of
21 It might be argued that a works council's wage e®ect is simply due to higher productivity of
¯rms with works councils, in which case higher wages do not necessarily imply a monopoly
e®ect. However, when including labor productivity as an additional regressor, its coe±cient
turned out to be small and insigni¯cant, while the parameter estimates of the works council
dummy and the wage variable were hardly a®ected. Therefore, we conclude that our argument15
Table 2: Determinants of workers' instantaneous separation rate to employment
Models
Explanatory variables
without establishment-frailties with establishment-frailties
Works council (dummy) {0.136 (0.058) {0.106 (0.057) {0.139 (0.054) {0.080 (0.054)
Log daily gross wage (in e) {0.508 (0.082) {0.597 (0.047)
Male (dummy) 0.060 (0.035) 0.166 (0.037) 0.054 (0.028) 0.172 (0.030)
Non-German (dummy) {0.217 (0.065) {0.219 (0.064) {0.258 (0.051) {0.266 (0.051)
Age under 21 years (ref. group) | | | |
Age 21{25 years (dummy) {0.227 (0.154) {0.179 (0.153) {0.196 (0.148) {0.148 (0.149)
Age 26{30 years (dummy) {0.326 (0.155) {0.236 (0.153) {0.271 (0.147) {0.177 (0.147)
Age 31{35 years (dummy) {0.496 (0.154) {0.372 (0.153) {0.448 (0.147) {0.315 (0.147)
Age 36{40 years (dummy) {0.717 (0.156) {0.577 (0.154) {0.678 (0.147) {0.526 (0.148)
Age 41{45 years (dummy) {0.949 (0.157) {0.802 (0.155) {0.912 (0.148) {0.751 (0.149)
Age 46{50 years (dummy) {1.138 (0.160) {0.988 (0.157) {1.108 (0.150) {0.943 (0.150)
Age 51{55 years (dummy) {1.237 (0.167) {1.086 (0.165) {1.213 (0.153) {1.048 (0.153)
Age 56{58 years (dummy) {1.139 (0.204) {0.989 (0.204) {1.118 (0.190) {0.957 (0.191)
No apprenticeship, no Abitur (ref. group) | | | |
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) {0.003 (0.059) 0.056 (0.057) 0.050 (0.041) 0.116 (0.041)
No apprenticeship, with Abitur (dummy) 0.206 (0.126) 0.276 (0.126) 0.290 (0.118) 0.351 (0.118)
Apprenticeship and Abitur (dummy) 0.160 (0.072) 0.261 (0.070) 0.184 (0.060) 0.297 (0.061)
Technical college degree (dummy) 0.288 (0.078) 0.445 (0.078) 0.328 (0.063) 0.505 (0.065)
University degree (dummy) 0.392 (0.078) 0.604 (0.081) 0.453 (0.061) 0.669 (0.063)
Basic manual occupation (ref. group) | | | |
Quali¯ed manual occupation (dummy) 0.240 (0.066) 0.267 (0.065) 0.172 (0.043) 0.209 (0.043)
Engineers and technicians (dummy) 0.349 (0.064) 0.483 (0.068) 0.364 (0.050) 0.525 (0.051)
Basic service occupation (dummy) 0.123 (0.085) 0.122 (0.083) 0.162 (0.055) 0.170 (0.055)
Quali¯ed service occupation (dummy) 0.383 (0.120) 0.446 (0.121) 0.273 (0.096) 0.359 (0.097)
Semi-professional (dummy) 0.389 (0.095) 0.527 (0.099) 0.405 (0.073) 0.563 (0.074)
Professional (dummy) 0.690 (0.111) 0.867 (0.116) 0.660 (0.088) 0.885 (0.089)
Basic business occupation (dummy) 0.603 (0.080) 0.690 (0.083) 0.510 (0.061) 0.614 (0.061)
Quali¯ed business occupation (dummy) 0.432 (0.066) 0.552 (0.068) 0.359 (0.046) 0.493 (0.047)
Manager (dummy) 0.527 (0.082) 0.750 (0.094) 0.544 (0.071) 0.810 (0.074)
Number of employees 6 20 (ref. group) | | | |
Number of employees 21{100 (dummy) {0.247 (0.081) {0.198 (0.082) {0.296 (0.065) {0.244 (0.065)
Number of employees 101{199 (dummy) {0.224 (0.091) {0.149 (0.093) {0.270 (0.074) {0.203 (0.075)
Number of employees 200{299 (dummy) {0.200 (0.099) {0.116 (0.098) {0.319 (0.080) {0.241 (0.080)
Number of employees > 300 (dummy) {0.367 (0.105) {0.279 (0.106) {0.360 (0.080) {0.285 (0.081)
Coll. agreement at sect. level (dummy) {0.046 (0.052) {0.031 (0.051) {0.038 (0.045) {0.020 (0.045)
Coll. agreement at ¯rm level (dummy) 0.096 (0.092) 0.106 (0.091) 0.112 (0.061) 0.119 (0.061)
Proportion of female workers {0.030 (0.120) {0.116 (0.119) {0.093 (0.088) {0.177 (0.088)
Proportion of quali¯ed workers {0.119 (0.110) {0.075 (0.112) {0.222 (0.067) {0.166 (0.067)
New production technology (dummy) {0.136 (0.066) {0.108 (0.064) {0.090 (0.032) {0.075 (0.032)
Bad economic pro¯tability (dummy) 0.214 (0.058) 0.153 (0.035)
Ten sectoral dummies p = 0:012 p = 0:015 p < 0:001 p < 0:001
Year 2000 (ref. group) | | | |
Year 2001 (dummy) {0.321 (0.044) {0.319 (0.044) {0.307 (0.024) {0.297 (0.024)
Year 2002 (dummy) {0.696 (0.076) {0.701 (0.076) {0.668 (0.034) {0.661 (0.034)
Frailty variance (^ #) 0.352 (0.022) 0.352 (0.022)
Observations 471,874 471,874 471,874 471,874
Workers 101,759 101,759 101,759 101,759
Transitions 9,147 9,147 9,147 9,147
Log likelihood {20,625.908 {20,517.907 {19,800.204 {19,707.980
McFadden-R2 0.113 0.118 0.149 0.153
Notes:
The data set used is version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model. Robust standard errors (adjusted for intra-
establishment correlations in the non-frailty models) are given in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable taking the value one if the individual changes from an IAB Panel-establishment to another establishment
and zero otherwise. Piecewise constant exponential models are ¯tted with and without shared gamma frailties, where
the baseline hazard is a step function in the worker's tenure. Tenure categories are given as 0{30, 31{60, 61{90,
91{120, 121{150, 151{180, 181{210, 211{240, 241{270, 271{300, 301{330, 331{360, 361{720, 721{1080, 1081{1440,
1441{1800, 1801{2160, 2161{2520, 2521{2800, 2881{3240, 3241{3600, 3601{5400, 5401{7200, and more than 7200
days of employment, respectively.16
the works council dummy does not di®er statistically from zero at the 5 percent level
anymore, so that there is only weak evidence for a voice e®ect in the full sample.22
The second hypothesis we are interested in is whether the existence of a works
council reduces the separation rate to non-employment, as reported in our descriptive
analysis. This is likely to be the case due to works councils' insurance function, which
should protect workers against dismissals and thus decrease their separation rate to
non-employment, ceteris paribus. As shows up in the ¯rst and the third column of
table 3, the existence of a works council has indeed a large and statistically signi¯cant
negative e®ect (at the 1 percent level) on the separation rate to non-employment.
Estimated coe±cients of ¡0:464 without and ¡0:456 with establishment frailties
indicate that the existence of a works council is associated with a ceteris paribus
decrease of the separation rate to non-employment by 37.1 and 36.6 percent,
respectively.
This e®ect, however, is likely to overestimate the impact of the works council's
insurance function. Separations to non-employment include both voluntary and
involuntary transitions, and voluntary transitions can be expected to be lower if
wages are higher. Since works councils usually increase workers' wages, the volume
of voluntary quits to non-employment is likely to depend negatively on the existence
of a works council. Thus, there should be a negative e®ect even if the works council
were not to exercise its insurance function at all. By controlling for the worker's daily
gross wage and the establishment's pro¯tability status, we expect to capture this
indirect e®ect of a works council on the workers' separation rate to non-employment.
Hence, the estimated coe±cient of the works council dummy should be lower when
these additional regressors are included. The estimates in columns two and four
are in line with these considerations. The magnitude of the estimated coe±cient
of the works council dummy is reduced by roughly one third, but it remains large
and statistically signi¯cant at the 1 percent level. Separation rates are 26.7 and 23.7
percent lower, respectively, if workers are employed in an establishment with a works
council.
In a next step, it seems interesting to look whether there are di®erences in the
impact of a works council for di®erent subgroups of workers. Do separation rates
di®er because works councils represent the interests of a speci¯c clientele and try to
improve the working conditions primarily of their median voters? In particular, are
there gender di®erences and di®erences according to tenure, which showed up in the
descriptive analysis in section 4?
remains valid that the wage variable mainly re°ects a monopoly e®ect.
22 Since there was a reform of the Works Constitution Act in mid-2001, which slightly increased
the powers of the works council, we investigated whether works council impact was di®erent
in 2002 by including a corresponding interaction term. This robustness check (the results of
which are available upon request) did not change our insights.17
Table 3: Determinants of workers' instantaneous separation rate to non-employment
Models
Explanatory variables
without establishment-frailties with establishment-frailties
Works council (dummy) {0.464 (0.104) {0.311 (0.094) {0.456 (0.063) {0.271 (0.062)
Log daily gross wage (in e) {1.547 (0.083) {1.501 (0.052)
Male (dummy) {0.233 (0.042) 0.111 (0.047) {0.237 (0.035) 0.075 (0.037)
Non-German (dummy) 0.367 (0.105) 0.377 (0.092) 0.365 (0.046) 0.341 (0.046)
Age under 21 years (ref. group) | | | |
Age 21{25 years (dummy) {0.493 (0.123) {0.278 (0.139) {0.424 (0.123) {0.164 (0.126)
Age 26{30 years (dummy) {0.606 (0.125) {0.289 (0.145) {0.544 (0.121) {0.187 (0.124)
Age 31{35 years (dummy) {0.718 (0.124) {0.330 (0.144) {0.636 (0.121) {0.206 (0.124)
Age 36{40 years (dummy) {0.912 (0.126) {0.487 (0.147) {0.827 (0.122) {0.362 (0.125)
Age 41{45 years (dummy) {1.061 (0.128) {0.621 (0.147) {0.961 (0.124) {0.481 (0.127)
Age 46{50 years (dummy) {1.039 (0.132) {0.596 (0.152) {0.945 (0.125) {0.471 (0.127)
Age 51{55 years (dummy) {0.825 (0.136) {0.385 (0.153) {0.717 (0.127) {0.241 (0.130)
Age 56{58 years (dummy) {0.145 (0.177) 0.288 (0.191) {0.024 (0.151) 0.425 (0.154)
No apprenticeship, no Abitur (ref. group) | | | |
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) {0.321 (0.060) {0.152 (0.054) {0.297 (0.043) {0.134 (0.043)
No apprenticeship, with Abitur (dummy) 0.222 (0.130) 0.280 (0.153) 0.212 (0.133) 0.266 (0.134)
Apprenticeship and Abitur (dummy) {0.256 (0.088) 0.045 (0.086) {0.251 (0.078) 0.046 (0.079)
Technical college degree (dummy) {0.243 (0.103) 0.219 (0.098) {0.245 (0.087) 0.190 (0.088)
University degree (dummy) 0.067 (0.099) 0.693 (0.091) 0.048 (0.076) 0.616 (0.078)
Basic manual occupation (ref. group) | | | |
Quali¯ed manual occupation (dummy) {0.072 (0.097) {0.001 (0.090) {0.153 (0.050) {0.084 (0.050)
Engineers and technicians (dummy) {0.307 (0.085) 0.097 (0.083) {0.296 (0.068) 0.097 (0.069)
Basic service occupation (dummy) {0.182 (0.105) {0.188 (0.096) {0.129 (0.060) {0.111 (0.060)
Quali¯ed service occupation (dummy) {0.258 (0.156) {0.054 (0.155) {0.261 (0.121) {0.057 (0.122)
Semi-professional (dummy) {0.167 (0.124) 0.251 (0.117) {0.218 (0.087) 0.189 (0.088)
Professional (dummy) 0.405 (0.136) 0.913 (0.126) 0.420 (0.106) 0.930 (0.105)
Basic business occupation (dummy) {0.079 (0.094) 0.118 (0.096) {0.092 (0.077) 0.113 (0.077)
Quali¯ed business occupation (dummy) {0.212 (0.078) 0.135 (0.073) {0.201 (0.056) 0.103 (0.057)
Manager (dummy) 0.003 (0.117) 0.667 (0.114) 0.090 (0.092) 0.733 (0.095)
Number of employees 6 20 (ref. group) | | | |
Number of employees 21{100 (dummy) {0.049 (0.080) 0.113 (0.083) {0.109 (0.077) 0.021 (0.076)
Number of employees 101{199 (dummy) {0.074 (0.113) 0.132 (0.112) {0.143 (0.089) 0.024 (0.088)
Number of employees 200{299 (dummy) {0.158 (0.116) 0.088 (0.117) {0.306 (0.096) {0.098 (0.095)
Number of employees > 300 (dummy) {0.216 (0.134) 0.063 (0.134) {0.272 (0.096) {0.059 (0.095)
Coll. agreement at sect. level (dummy) 0.046 (0.074) 0.098 (0.068) 0.039 (0.053) 0.075 (0.053)
Coll. agreement at ¯rm level (dummy) {0.003 (0.099) 0.037 (0.092) 0.014 (0.076) 0.039 (0.075)
Proportion of female workers {0.192 (0.156) {0.417 (0.138) {0.198 (0.102) {0.380 (0.100)
Proportion of quali¯ed workers {0.458 (0.138) {0.256 (0.129) {0.300 (0.079) {0.126 (0.078)
New production technology (dummy) {0.102 (0.059) {0.046 (0.056) {0.108 (0.039) {0.078 (0.038)
Bad economic pro¯tability (dummy) 0.279 (0.059) 0.257 (0.042)
Ten sectoral dummies p < 0:001 p < 0:001 p < 0:001 p < 0:001
Year 2000 (ref. group) | | | |
Year 2001 (dummy) {0.242 (0.044) {0.239 (0.044) {0.241 (0.032) {0.233 (0.032)
Year 2002 (dummy) {0.231 (0.059) {0.225 (0.058) {0.213 (0.042) {0.204 (0.043)
Frailty variance (^ #) 0.443 (0.029) 0.394 (0.028)
Observations 471,874 471,874 471,874 471,874
Workers 101,759 101,759 101,759 101,759
Transitions 5,714 5,714 5,714 5,714
Log likelihood {16,239.401 {15,701.107 {15,592.791 {15,185.256
McFadden-R2 0.159 0.187 0.192 0.213
Notes:
The data set used is version 2 of the LIAB longitudinal model. Robust standard errors (adjusted for intra-
establishment correlations in the non-frailty models) are given in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable taking the value one if the individual changes from an IAB Panel-establishment to non-employment and
zero otherwise. Piecewise constant exponential models are ¯tted with and without shared gamma frailties, where
the baseline hazard is a step function in the worker's tenure. Tenure categories are 0{30, 31{60, 61{90, 91{120,
121{150, 151{180, 181{210, 211{240, 241{270, 271{300, 301{330, 31{360, 361{720, 721{1080, 1081{1440, 1441{
1800, 1801{2160, 2161{2520, 2521{2800, 2881{3240, 3241{3600, 3601{5400, 5401{7200, and more than 7200 days
of employment, respectively.18
Starting with gender di®erences, works councils may be more inclined to
represent the interests of men than of women for at least two reasons: First, since
in Germany the labor force attachment of women and their share in the workforce
is traditionally lower than that of men, works councillors who aim to be reelected
have a strong incentive to serve men ¯rst. This is consistent with empirical ¯ndings
of a negative correlation between the employment share of women in a plant and the
probability of works council existence (see, e.g., HÄ ubler and Jirjahn, 2003; Addison
et al., 2003). Second, works councils are still dominated by men. The share of female
works council members is substantially lower than women's employment share, and
in eight out of nine works councils the chair person is a man (see Niedenho®, 2002,
p. 316).
If works councils do primarily represent the interests of male employees, the
coe±cients of the works council dummies in the two hazard rate models should be
lower in absolute value for women than for men. Table 4 shows that this is indeed
the case in every speci¯cation. Moreover, works council impact on separations to
employment is not statistically signi¯cant for women, whereas for men we ¯nd
the same pattern as in table 2 for the full sample (i.e. works council e®ects
loose signi¯cance once wage and pro¯tability variables are included). Concerning
separations to non-employment, we ¯nd evidence for the works council insurance
function in both subgroups, but estimated works council e®ects are twice as high
for men than for women in our preferred speci¯cations with wage and pro¯tability
variables.23 Taken together, these results suggest that works council existence is
indeed more favorable for men than for women (even if we are not able to prove that
women's interests are neglected on purpose).24
The e®ects of works council existence on the two separation rates may vary
between groups of workers with di®erent tenure. Concerning separations to non-
employment, we would expect that a works council insures more tenured workers
more e®ectively against dismissals as these are arguably the works council's primary
clientele (although employment protection of this group is usually higher even in
the absence of a works council). As regards the separation rate to employment,
improving working conditions via the voice route may show up more pronouncedly
23 One might argue that the lower works council impact for women arises because they are more
likely to move (voluntarily) into non-employment. Although it is not very convincing to treat
the hazards of separation into unemployment and into unknown destinations as independent,
we also estimated the probability of separations into unemployment as a sort of robustness
check. These (unreported) estimations showed the same pattern, i.e. the existence of a works
council reduces the exits into unemployment more for men than for women.
24 With respect to wages, however, it has been shown that women pro¯t more from the presence of
works councils than do men and that works councils reduce the gender wage gap (see Gartner
and Stephan, 2004; Heinze and Wolf, 2009; Addison et al., 2009). In addition, Heywood and
Jirjahn (2009) report that family-friendly work-practices (which should be more important
for female employees) are more likely if a works council exists.19
Table 4: The impact of a works council on the instantaneous separation
rate to employment and non-employment by gender
Female workers





























































(1) model without, (2) model with log wage and pro¯tability as regressors
Notes:
Reported numbers are the estimated coe±cient of the works council dummy in
a piecewise constant exponential model for the instantaneous separation rate to
employment and non-employment, respectively, like those models from tables 2
and 3. Robust standard errors (adjusted for intra-establishment correlations in the
non-frailty models) are given in parentheses.
for less tenured employees. This should hold because more tenured employees, who
have acquired more ¯rm-speci¯c human capital, have obviously decided to stay with
the ¯rm for a longer time and thus cannot be too discontent with the establishment's
working conditions. To investigate these two hypotheses, we added interaction terms
of works council existence and ¯ve tenure dummies to the hazard models, where
tenure categories are given by not more than 0.5, 0.5{1, 1{2, 2{5 and more than 5
years.
Table 5 reports results that are in line with both conjectures. In all speci¯cations,
the negative impact of the works council dummy on the separation rate to non-
employment is more pronounced for workers with higher tenure. More precisely,
there is a negative and signi¯cant e®ect only for workers whose tenure is more than
one year, where the highest e®ect is found for workers with more than ¯ve years of
tenure. For this group the separation rate is decreased by 35.3 percent in the non-20
Table 5: The impact of a works council on the instantaneous separation rate to
employment and non-employment by tenure
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(1) model without, (2) model with log wage and pro¯tability as regressors
Notes:
Reported numbers are the estimated coe±cient of the interaction term of the works council
dummy and the corresponding tenure dummy in a piecewise constant exponential model for
the instantaneous separation rate to employment and non-employment, respectively, like those
models from tables 2 and 3. Robust standard errors (adjusted for intra-establishment correlations
in the non-frailty models) are given in parentheses.
frailty and 36.8 percent in the frailty model when wages and pro¯tability are included
as regressors. From this we conclude that the insurance e®ect is more important for
tenured workers.
As expected, things are the other way round for separations to employment and
the voice e®ect. For workers with up to one year of tenure, the existence of a works
council has a substantial negative and signi¯cant impact on the separation rate
to employment. In the speci¯cation with wages and pro¯tability as regressors, for
example, the separation rate to employment in the frailty model is reduced by 28.0
percent for workers with not more than half a year of tenure and by 32.6 percent for
those with 0.5{1 years of tenure. In contrast, the estimated coe±cients for workers
with more than two years of tenure are still negative, but small and insigni¯cant.
What is more, while we found only weak evidence for the voice e®ect in table 2, when
not allowing for heterogeneity in the impact of a works council across di®erently
tenured workers, there seems to exist a clear voice e®ect for workers who recently
joined the ¯rm. For workers with no more than one year of tenure, the magnitude21
and the statistical signi¯cance of works council coe±cients are not much reduced
when monopoly e®ects are taken into account by including wages and pro¯tability
as additional variables. This again underscores that various groups of workers bene¯t
in di®erent ways from works council existence.
6 Conclusions
Using a large linked employer{employee data set for western Germany and methods
of competing risk survival analysis, we have investigated the e®ect of works councils
on separations, distinguishing between separations to employment and to non-
employment. The results of our empirical analysis indicate that the existence of a
works council is associated with a lower separation rate to employment, in particular
for men and for workers with low tenure. While works council monopoly e®ects show
up in all speci¯cations, a clear voice e®ect is only visible for low tenured workers.
Works councils are also found to reduce separations to non-employment, and this
impact is more pronounced for men. Insurance e®ects of works councils only show
up for workers with tenure of more than one year.
Our results suggest that looking at aggregate e®ects only could be misleading.
It is important to distinguish between di®erent sorts of separations and between
various groups of workers in a plant who seem to bene¯t in di®erent ways from the
existence of a works council. Voice and insurance e®ects, for example, are only visible
for subgroups of workers with di®erent tenure. The fact that works councils, which
are still dominated by men, are found to reduce particularly the separation rates of
men is an indication that they represent the interests of a speci¯c clientele and try
to improve primarily the working conditions and job security of their median voters.
In order to investigate this aspect further, we would need information on the
gender composition of works councils which is not available in our data set. Another
limitation may be that we could only employ a dummy variable indicating the
existence of a works council in a plant but lacked information on the type or behavior
of the works council, for instance whether it is cooperative or not (some information
of this sort will be available in future waves of the data set). Future research should
also try to distinguish between quits and dismissals more clearly than we were
able with our data set. Despite these limitations, our analysis indicates that works
councils do exhibit monopoly, voice, and insurance e®ects worth to be investigated
further, e.g. by studying the impact of introducing or abolishing a works council.22
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Appendix
Appendix Table: Descriptive statistics; means






Works council (dummy) 0.841 0.843 0.836 0.758 0.844
Log. of daily wage 4.543 4.601 4.387 4.380 4.549
Male (dummy) 0.729 1.000 0.000 0.750 0.729
Non-German (dummy) 0.066 0.069 0.056 0.090 0.065
Tenure (number of years) 10.423 10.488 10.247 0.730 10.504
Age under 21 years (dummy) 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.019 0.002
Age 21{25 years (dummy) 0.049 0.038 0.079 0.130 0.047
Age 26{30 years (dummy) 0.114 0.105 0.138 0.191 0.112
Age 31{35 years (dummy) 0.177 0.184 0.160 0.218 0.177
Age 36{40 years (dummy) 0.190 0.202 0.158 0.169 0.191
Age 41{45 years (dummy) 0.175 0.178 0.167 0.127 0.176
Age 46{50 years (dummy) 0.160 0.158 0.164 0.095 0.161
Age 51{55 years (dummy) 0.116 0.117 0.114 0.051 0.117
Age 56{58 years (dummy) 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.001 0.017
No apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) 0.156 0.148 0.177 0.192 0.154
Apprenticeship, no Abitur (dummy) 0.692 0.696 0.679 0.616 0.694
No apprenticeship, with Abitur (dummy) 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.007
Apprenticeship and Abitur (dummy) 0.047 0.039 0.068 0.057 0.047
Technical college degree (dummy) 0.045 0.052 0.026 0.052 0.045
University degree (dummy) 0.053 0.057 0.042 0.075 0.053
Basic manual occupation (dummy) 0.216 0.249 0.124 0.241 0.214
Quali¯ed manual occupation (dummy) 0.177 0.225 0.048 0.160 0.177
Engineers and technicians (dummy) 0.113 0.139 0.044 0.103 0.114
Basic service occupation (dummy) 0.096 0.111 0.056 0.121 0.095
Quali¯ed service occupation (dummy) 0.017 0.008 0.042 0.016 0.017
Semi-professional (dummy) 0.058 0.030 0.135 0.044 0.059
Professional (dummy) 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.015
Basic business occupation (dummy) 0.054 0.032 0.112 0.056 0.054
Quali¯ed business occupation (dummy) 0.229 0.164 0.405 0.205 0.230
Manager (dummy) 0.025 0.028 0.017 0.034 0.025
Establishment size 6 20 employees (dummy) 0.034 0.032 0.041 0.044 0.033
Establishment size 21{100 employees (dummy) 0.190 0.191 0.185 0.209 0.189
Establishment size 101{199 employees (dummy) 0.212 0.211 0.216 0.233 0.212
Establishment size 200{299 employees (dummy) 0.224 0.231 0.206 0.259 0.224
Establishment size > 300 employees (dummy) 0.339 0.335 0.352 0.255 0.342
No coll. agreement (dummy) 0.161 0.156 0.175 0.209 0.159
Coll. agreement at sectoral level (dummy) 0.719 0.723 0.710 0.659 0.721
Coll. agreement at ¯rm level (dummy) 0.119 0.121 0.115 0.132 0.119
Proportion of female workers 0.344 0.275 0.531 0.336 0.345
Proportion of quali¯ed workers 0.728 0.729 0.725 0.681 0.730
New production technology (dummy) 0.486 0.456 0.567 0.486 0.485
Bad economic pro¯tability (dummy) 0.215 0.226 0.187 0.171 0.217
Year 2000 (ref. group ) 0.375 0.373 0.380 0.892 0.342
Year 2001 (dummy) 0.334 0.335 0.331 0.108 0.380
Year 2002 (dummy) 0.291 0.292 0.289 0.000 0.278
Agriculture, hunting, and forestry including ¯shing (dummy) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.003
Mining, quarrying, electricity, gas, and water supply (dummy) 0.026 0.031 0.013 0.037 0.026
Manufacturing (dummy) 0.454 0.510 0.303 0.411 0.455
Construction (dummy) 0.042 0.054 0.010 0.048 0.042
Trade and repair (dummy) 0.088 0.084 0.098 0.099 0.088
Transport, storage and communication (dummy) 0.025 0.030 0.013 0.028 0.025
Financial intermediation (dummy) 0.048 0.039 0.070 0.032 0.048
Business activities (dummy) 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.079 0.049
Other activities (dummy) 0.124 0.079 0.244 0.136 0.123
Non-pro¯t organizations and public administration (dummy) 0.141 0.120 0.197 0.123 0.141
Workers 101,759 74,232 27,527 10,653 100,363
Notes:
The sum of workers with not more than one year of tenure and of workers with more than one year of tenure (111,016)
is larger than the total number of workers (101,759) since 9,257 workers switch between both categories during the
observation period.   
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